China and the Japanese threat

Have you ever had a conversation with a Japanese person about the "Chinese threat," reader?

If so, you were struck by the similarity between his argument and that of a true German, when he explains the necessity for the German Empire to engage in 1914, in a "war of defense."

"We are afraid," say the Japanese, "of the formidable power represented by these compact populations of 400 million Chinese." And because the Japanese are "afraid," they insist on harassing and terrorizing the Chinese, seizing control of regions inhabited by them, of railways and mineral deposits—in short, condemning China to vassalage.

Japan's imperialist policy in the Far East is therefore remarkably similar to Germany's former imperialist policy in Europe. And since all wise policies are ultimately based on economic foundations, this imperialist policy has been justified on both sides by the needs of Japan and Germany to find new outlets for their industries and trade and to push for the expansion of their territories in order to absorb their surplus population. [[See, for example, Japan's foreign policy as explained by the Japanese author K.-K. Kawakami in his book Japan in World Politics, Macmillan C°, London and New York. For him, too, this policy is based on "the instinct of self-preservation." The main motive behind the country's actions "was driven by the instinctive feeling that the situation of its small archipelago, overpopulated and endowed with only limited resources, was threatened both from outside and from within." The path to its preservation lies with Japan, asserts the author in his "solution to the Chinese question." The policy of "Asia for Asians" advocated by Mr. Kawakami seems to mean for him: "Asia for the Japanese."

And it was not only the general policies of the two empires that were similar, but also the methods of execution and the governmental tactics applied on both sides. Japanese subjects residing in China, having been subject to Japanese jurisdiction in recent years, and the Chinese authorities cannot require them to obey the law without the approval of the Japanese consul (without reciprocity, of course, for Chinese citizens residing in Japan), Japan had complete freedom to organize espionage in China, just as the German government organized espionage in England, France, and the United States before the Great War. The Japanese were therefore able to foment conflicts in the Young Chinese Republic at will, just as the Germans fomented conflicts in Europe, America, and pretty much everywhere else.

Finally, it was Wilhelm II's Germany that directly served as a model for the Land of the Mikado in terms of the policy to be pursued in China: it was the German Empire that first demanded what was dubbed its "sphere of influence," particularly over the Chinese province of Shandong, after the occupation of Kiaochow in 1898. the other great powers followed suit, each claiming its own "sphere of influence"; but all were surpassed in their ambitions by greedy Japan, the upstart nation of the Far East. Even in terms of the cruelties committed in the execution of a doctrine of national conquest, Japan seems to have been keen to follow the Prussian example: the Chinese delegation in Paris is in possession of a substantial dossier, consisting of six volumes of petitions and complaints concerning the outrages and cruelties committed by Japanese troops in Chantung. Among the cases listed are examples of the complete destruction of villages and inexcusable assassinations.

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China, the oldest of all nations in the world, is undoubtedly also one of the most peaceful: it is the model member of this future League of Nations where all disputes are resolved amicably, through arbitration and without bloodshed. This is due to its thousands of years of history and the philosophical and moral education of its masses. " All between the four seas are brothers" is a Chinese concept that predates the Christian concept of universal brotherhood, and despite the fact that the Chinese Republic is of very recent origin, the Chinese people have been nurtured for centuries on the principles of democracy [[Facts recalled in a propaganda brochure published by Chinese associations in Paris and London under the title: China and the League of Nations, pages 5 and 8.

The country's natural resources are immense, both from an industrial point of view, as it has rich mineral deposits, and from an agricultural point of view. The Chinese are good workers, intelligent and hardworking; but the masses are poor and poorly educated; industrial technology is not very developed in the major centers, and modern means of communication and transportation are still sorely lacking. In short, China is an El Dorado for capitalist exploitation on a gigantic scale.

On the other hand, for centuries, Chinese civilization had spread to Japan, Korea, Siam, and Annam, far beyond the borders of the Celestial Empire itself. Until relatively recently, there could therefore have been Japanese domination in China, and the two peoples lived in peace.

It was Japanese militarism, modeled on Western militarism, that changed the friendly relations between them. Defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 – 95, the Chinese colossus did not think of revenge, but, realizing the backward state of the country, it called for "reforms" in all areas of political and social life.

During this time, the victor was determined to increasingly and constantly poison relations between neighbors, and animosity intensified, especially after 1905, following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.

Having defeated a major European power, Japan began to believe itself the master of all Asia. First and foremost, the Chinese Empire had to transfer to Japan all the rights that Russia had enjoyed in Manchuria before the war. This was not too heavy a burden for the Chinese, who had viewed the growing influence of the Muscovite Empire in North Asia with displeasure. But Japan went ever further in its demands, and its attitude became increasingly aggressive.

The outbreak of the Great European War gave Japan an unparalleled opportunity to impose its domination on its weaker, less militarized neighbor. Indeed, the major European powers were locked in a deadly struggle, and the United States was not yet in a position to intervene effectively on China's behalf.

Under the pretext of fulfilling its role as an ally of Great Britain and wanting to prevent future unrest in the Far East, Japanese troops drove the Germans out of Kiao-Tchéou. Then, not content with replacing Germany, Japan extended the military occupation zone, making arbitrary requisitions, driving out the civil authorities of the province, and seizing the railways and mines far beyond the demarcation line.

Suddenly, in the midst of international war, on January 18, 1915, shortly after the fall of Kiao-Tchéou, Japan sent Chinese President Yuan Shikai its famous 21 demands, forcing him to sign most of them while reserving the rest for future negotiations. The treaty of May 25, 1915, was thus imposed on China, which never ceased to protest against the arrogance of Japanese imperialism.

We do not have enough space here to examine in detail Japan's main demands; suffice it to say that they subject the Chinese people to Japan's economic and political vassalage.
The attitude of the Allies

But the situation in the Far East has become particularly alarming for China and precarious from an international perspective since the decision of the Paris Peace Conference to grant the Chinese province of Shandong to Japan.

Through its occupation of the island of Formosa, located near the Chinese province of Fujian, its annexation of Korea, and its privileges over Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan's situation is already extremely threatening to China.

By giving Japan the province of Chantung today, the Allies have handed it the key to the entire northern coast of China and placed Beijing under immediate threat in the event of a Japanese attack.

Let us not concern ourselves with the question of whether the 1915 treaty is legally defensible; in any case, it is unjust from the point of view of the right of nations to determine their own destiny and from an international perspective, it will remain condemned in the same way as the famous treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk.

However, the Peace Conference ratified key points of the treaty that Japan had succeeded in imposing on its neighbor; It is against this ratification that we must protest in the name of the very Wilsonian principles that formed the basis of the world peace negotiations and in the international interest of the peoples.

We know what a storm of indignation the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles relating to China have stirred up in the United States.

Last August, the Senate Committee decided that the word "Japan" should be replaced by the word "China" in Articles 156, 157, and 158, which concern Chantung.

The Commission therefore demanded that Article 156 begin as follows:

Germany renounces, in favor of China, all its rights, titles, and privileges—notably concerning the territory of Kiao-Tchéou, the railroads, the mines, and the submarine cables, — which it acquired under the treaty it signed with China on March 6, 1898, and all other acts concerning the province of Shandong."

Similarly, for the other articles relating to the claims presented by the Chinese delegates in their memorandum of February 1919, the US Senate Committee proposed that several of the rights or properties that Germany had to cede should be transferred to China and not to Japan.

Will American opinion succeed in imposing its will? It is true that the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the US Senate or any change to its annual text would lead to insurmountable international difficulties. Will a compromise be found? Will Japan be given time to return Chantung to China without waiting for a clear decision on this point from the Peace Conference?

In any case, the scandal must stop. We must avert the danger, already predicted as imminent, that China, supported by the United States and perhaps, it is said, by England and the English colonies in the Pacific, will declare war on imperialist Japan and that the " international and lasting peace" that we have been waiting for from the Paris Conference is compromised even before this conference has finished its sessions.

It should be noted that this is a vital issue, not only for China, but also for the United States, and one whose scope far exceeds the personal influence of President Wilson or Senator Lodge.

American industry, like British industry, has the greatest interest in free entry into China and all the markets of this immense Asian continent, where everything needs to be reorganized and which still contains immeasurable natural treasures. "Asia for the Japanese" is the last maxim that the great capitalist powers could favor or tolerate. And we, who do not judge problems from a capitalist point of view, but from the idealistic point of view of the right of peoples to free existence and international fraternization, must admit that this time, our sympathies will lie with those who can teach the Japanese government that military force, national arrogance, and diplomatic tricks are no longer enough for a state to dominate the world and tyrannize neighboring peoples.