Italy's role and world peace

These days, a French philosopher, well versed in Italian history, pointed out that the government in Rome is in danger of soon suffering the fate of the famous Machiavelli, who ended his days in a suburb of Florence, abandoned by all and in the utmost poverty, — not because he had lost his intelligence, but because no one dared to lend him a hand anymore: he was too cunning.

Throughout the war and up to the present day, those who have presided over the destiny of the Italian people have been too cunning, gifted with a professional skill that hindered their colleagues of other nationalities and made them wary of them.

It was in the name of the principle of "sacred selfishness" that the Salandra government decided to enter the war in 1915. But Italy was careful not to break immediately and definitively with Germany. Having initially declared war only on Austria, from which it wished to wrest regions of unquestionably Italian language and civilization, it was only gradually, over the course of several months, that Italy was persuaded to openly enter the war against the German Empire as well. In this way, it allowed an awkward ambiguity to hang over Europe for too long.

Then, Italy constantly waged its own little war; and "la guerra nostra," as it was called there with such enthusiasm, always remained a war of small operations on the sidelines, directed at points where Italy deemed it useful to get involved.

The Thessaloniki expedition did not find favor with the government in Rome, despite its importance in the fall of Austria. Thessaloniki already seemed too far away for Italy, if not in terms of its ambitions, then at least in terms of military operations. Even at the critical moment in September 1918, the action of three French divisions and one Serbian division dealt the final blow to the Bulgarians and the Serbian contingents were about to invade the regions behind the Austrian front, Italian troops marched at their leisure. "Where are the Italians?" people asked again at this decisive moment for Europe.

Italy should never have forgotten the good services rendered to its cause by the Serbian army. By cutting off Austrian communications, it was this army that prepared and made possible the Italian victory.

In the global struggle between democracy and absolutism, Italy's overly self-serving goals became even clearer to the astonished world after the armistice than before: once again, it was the Yugoslavs who were the first victims.

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When Italy now intends to receive, as a reward for its support of the common cause of the Allies, territories that far exceed the most extensive irredentist program before the war, and located in the heart of Yugoslavia, it usually bases its claims on the "Treaty of London." But when this Treaty does not mention the disputed regions, or even assigns these regions to Yugoslavia, — as is the case with the city of Fiume — then the Italians invoke special reasons and appeal to President Wilson's principles.

However, two arguments, far from complementing each other, contradict each other: The Treaty of London is a secret agreement, concluded by Italy with other great powers in obscurity, which disposes of populations without taking their wishes into account. To refer to such an agreement, after having accepted peace, in agreement with the other nations of the Entente, on the basis of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny, is, on the part of the Italian government, a profoundly immoral act [[See this immorality clearly exposed in the interesting brochure by Dr. Ivan Marija-Cok, Le Pacte de Rose. Italy and its Morals, Paris, June 1919.]] and just as clumsy!

Then, it must be taken into consideration that, in an agreement such as the London Pact, there is always a certain counterbalance between the parties in terms of the spoils that the allies divide among themselves, and even from a material point of view, there could be no question of paying any attention to a treaty that assigned Constantinople to Russia! Finally, the London Pact was concluded without the knowledge of the Yugoslavs! And since the latter, through their services, were openly recognized as Allies on the same footing as the Italians, the Entente could not enforce the secret Treaty of London against them.

But Italy's conduct towards its weaker sister Yugoslavia must be judged all the more severely because there is an Italian-Yugoslav pact; not a secret one, but one that was publicly discussed, concluded at the Congress of Rome held by the "oppressed peoples" from April 8 to 10, 1918 [[See the same brochure on the Pact of Rome]].

We all remember as if it were yesterday the joy with which we received the news in Paris that Italy would lead the alliance of nations oppressed by Austria: Italians, Romanians, Poles, Yugoslavs, and Czechoslovaks.

The Italian-Yugoslav pact, in particular, drafted by mutual agreement between Dr. Andrea Torre, Italian deputy, and Dr. Ante Trumbic, on the Yugoslav side, left no doubt about the broad-mindedness on both sides:

…§ 6. They (the representatives of both peoples) undertake to settle amicably, also in the interests of good and sincere future relations between the two peoples, outstanding territorial issues on the basis of the principle of nationalities and the right of peoples to determine their own destiny, in such a way as not to prejudice the vital interests of both nations, which will be defined at the time of peace;

§ 7. The core populations of one of the peoples that should be included within the borders of the other shall be recognized and guaranteed the right to have their language, culture, and moral and economic interests respected.

The Italian authorities, currently engaged in conflict in the Yugoslav regions occupied by their armies, because they are suppressing the Yugoslav language and prohibiting its use in schools and churches, readily justify themselves by saying that the Treaty of Rome was never "officially recognized by Italy." This reasoning is also singularly Machiavellian and cannot be accepted by the civilized world.

The Rome Pact was never officially recognized because the United States was at war in 1918 and one of the two contracting parties was made up of nations living under Austrian rule. But we all refer to the general approval that the Rome Pact received in Italy, both from government representatives and in popular meetings. It suffices to recall the statements made in early 1918 by the Italian Prime Minister, Orlando, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sonnino.

The President of the Council, receiving a delegation from the Congress the day after the Rome Congress, expressed the sympathy of the Italian Government, as well as its agreement with the resolutions adopted, — which amounted to giving official sanction to the deliberations of the Rome Congress. If, due to circumstances beyond its control, the sanction in optima forma was not realized, how does this affect the essential nature of the pact?

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Let us be cautious in our conclusions when it comes to judging disputes between nationalities. In such cases, often "to know everything is to understand everything." It is extremely difficult to establish in Paris what exactly is true in the endless accusations made each week against the Italian authorities on the Dalmatian coast occupied by the Italian armies. But one thing emerges from all these accusations: the situation created by Italy cannot remain as it is in this day and age.

There are too many facts, too general and too precise, which prove that Italy is not only violating the provisions of the Treaty of Rome by banning the Yugoslav language, external signs of Yugoslav nationality, but that it is involved in numerous conspiracies against the interests of the Slavic peoples, in exactly the same way as Austro-German diplomacy did.

The deportations of Yugoslavs to Italy have been confirmed as historical fact by the publication of the names of some of the victims, and the Government has so far been unable to refute the facts presented on this subject by the prosecution.

It is clear that Italy has few scruples about the denationalization process undertaken in Istria and Dalmatia!

Everything leads us to believe that the incidents in Montenegro were due to the machinations of agents of the former king of Montenegro, Nicolas, and that his agents acted "with Italian assistance." And so on.

If Italy were not Italy, one of the great Allied powers that must be treated with kid gloves, we would have had an Inter-Allied Committee of Inquiry into all these matters long ago!

Wherever we have direct relations with our Italian comrades, we can try to convince them to counterbalance the systematic chauvinist propaganda spread by the Italian nationalist press, always ready to whip up the enthusiasm of the crowds.

The decision to be taken by the Supreme Council of the Entente concerning the city of Fiume is a most delicate matter. If this decision does not meet the demands of Italian chauvinists, let us make the Italian masses understand, through the workers' press, that we cannot leave the entire Hungarian, Yugoslav, Romanian, and Czechoslovak hinterland of Fiume without direct and independent access to the sea. Let us remind the Italian people that the mere fact that Austria refused Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea in order to keep it under its economic control significantly worsened relations between the two countries... to the point of war, which was the seed of universal cataclysm.

Recently, an interview with Scheidemann revealed that Germany is closely following developments in the conflicts on the Dalmatian coast and in the Balkans. Many Germans are hoping for a war between Yugoslavia, alone or supported by others, and Italy.

Is this how we will achieve the well-being of peoples?

Certainly not, and that is why Italian public opinion must be steered in a less selfish, broader, and more generous direction.

The Italian labor press therefore has an important role to play; it must influence Italian public opinion in general, for the benefit of world peace.